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Abstract 
Accounting standards such as lease standard can be applied opportunistically by managers to 
manipulate the economic substance of transaction. This phenomenon is reduced by using the 
principles-based accounting standard. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of 
principles-based versus rules-based accounting standard and audit committee on constraining 
aggressive financial reporting. This research manipulated with the type of accounting standards 
(principles-based and rules-based) and the type of audit committee (strong and weak) in the auditors 
group. Our results indicate that auditors are less likely to report aggressively under a less precise 
(principles-based) standard than under a more precise (rules-based) standard. Also, we find no effect 
of audit committee on the aggressively financial reporting. This result suggests that accounting 
standard setters can move in direction of the less precise standards to improve the financial reporting 
quality.  
Keywords: standard precision; rules-based standard; principle-based standard and audit 
committee.  
Introduction 
Acceptance of a global set of accounting standards such as the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) as early as 2015, newly recertified support by Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) (Backof et al, 2014). The standard setters use the rules-based and principles-
based standard approaches. Principles-based accounting standards refer to a system of financial 
reporting that is based primarily on the fundamentals of accounting ( i.e. decision usefulness, true 
and fair view, going concern, substance over form)  and implying extensive opportunities for 
professional judgment (Van Beaet,2009). In principles-based accounting standard is more clearly 
conveys the economic substance of transactions and so, the important of professional judgment is 
increase. In Contrary, Rules-based accounting standards are interpreted as a system of financial 
reporting, that is based on detailed guidance and possess more bright line tests as well as exceptions 
to the principles underlying the standard. Nelson, (2003) and Schipper (2003) suggest that 
comparability between financial reports is increased by using precise standards and auditors face 
better opportunities to verify reporting information. 
  The move towards a principles-based approach in accounting standards has been begin after 
the occurrence the accounting fraud such as  Enron, WorldCom and Tyco  and the U.S. Congress 
passed Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). This events lead to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) and Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) to consider amend programs to forbid 
aggressive financial reporting. These reforms contain a move toward more principles-based 
accounting standards and raising the role of the audit committee. Regard to International Financial 
Reporting Standard (IFRS) is principles-based and U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
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(GAAP) is rules-based; it is concerns about the change position to International Financial Reporting 
Standard (IFRS) and adaption of principles-based standards. The one of challenges in accounting 
standard approaches is whether auditors can restrain managers’ aggressive financial reporting under 
IFRS without the bright lines present in U.S. GAAP (Backof et al, 2014, Agoglia et al, 2011, Jamal 
and Tan, 2010). Nelson (2003) believes that aggressive reporting is bias elements of the financial 
statements either upwards or downwards. In addition to, aggressive reporting can define as the 
practice of the financial reporting prepares in using the accounting procedures in order to manipulate 
financial statement items to make a company appear more attractive to investors. The primary and 
main question of this study is whether auditors can constrain managers’ aggressive financial 
reporting under the principles-based accounting standard or not. 
We posit that auditors by using the less precise standard (principles-based standard) can to 
limit managers’ propensity to engage in aggressive accounting reporting practices. Also, the second 
hypothesis investigates effect the interaction of between audit and accounting standard approaches 
on aggressive accounting reporting. 
Our motivation for this study is decrease in concern related to the role of auditor on the effect 
accounting standard approaches on aggressive financial reporting and consequently on the financial 
reporting quality. The other motivation is the role of audit committee as a mentoring mechanism on 
the management opportunities behaviors and its effect on the auditor’s judgment in restrain 
aggressive financial reporting. 
This paper contributes to the accounting standard approaches literature on the effect rules-
based versus principles-based accounting standard on aggressive financial reporting. Considering of 
differences in culture and judgmental skills of auditors, our results clear useful evidence on the 
dissert regard to the efficacy of principles- versus rules-based standards in the developing country. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 present accounting standard setting in 
Iran. Section 3 illustrates relevant prior studies. Section 4 describes hypothesis development. Section 
5 describes research methodology and research sample. Section 6 presents and discusses the 
empirical results of this study. Finally, Section 7 gives a brief summary and conclusion. 
Accounting Standards Setting in Iran  
Accounting standard is prepared by Audit Organization (AO) in Iran. Audit Organization 
(AO) is established as a state body in 1987 by the merge of three aforementioned audit firms: the 
Nationalized Industries and Plan Organization Audit Firm (1980), the Mostazafan Foundation Audit 
Firm (1981) and the Shahed Audit Firm (1983).Audit Organization is the only regulatory body for 
accounting and audit standards setting.  
Accounting standards setters in Iran did not adopt the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) and all companies required to use the Iranian National Accounting Standard (INAS) when 
prepare financial reporting. Although Audit Organization has not accepted the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), Iranian National Accounting Standard is developed based on 
the IFRS. 
   Literature Review 
In this section the several of studies have been recently presented that are related to auditors’ 
judgments and accounting standard precision and their effects on aggressive financial reporting.  
Backof et al (2014) response to the question whether another judgment guidance aid Big 4 audit 
managers and partners to restrict management’s aggressive financial reporting in condition that 
accounting standards precision differ. The research method is based on the case. 219 practicing audit 
managers and partners participated in this experiment using a 2 ൈ 4 factorial design. They find that 
  
Mohammad Mehdi Abbasian, Ahmad Yaghoob-Nezhad, Ramezanali Royaee, Yahya Hassas Yeganeh 
 
 
Openly accessible at http://www.european-science.com                                                     193 
 
 
when accounting standards are less precise and using a judgment framework, auditor are less likely 
to accept aggressive financial reporting. But, in condition that absence a judgment framework the 
auditors are more likely to allow aggressive reporting. 
Tsunogaya et al (2014) investigate the impact of type of lease accounting on the judgments 
of Japanese professional accountants. The research method is based on the scenario. They examine 
whether a principles-based accounting standard with rules and guidance amends the judgments of 
accountants and more explicitly transfers the economic substance of transactions. 112 Japanese 
Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) participate in experiment and in this research contained two 
scenarios. The results indicate that principle-based and rule-based had a positive and negative effect 
(respectively) on encouraging Japanese professional accountants to recognize lease transactions. 
Peytcheva et al (2014) examines how the type of accounting standard influences auditors' cognitive 
motivations and demand for audit evidence. U.S. and Dutch auditors are participating in experiment 
design. The result suggests the important influence of accounting standards on auditors' motivations 
and consequent program planning decisions. 
Cohen et al (2013) response to the question whether higher-quality financial reporting will be 
increase with the adoption of a principles-based approach, such as IFRS. They employ 97 
experienced auditors as participants. Using a scenario setting include the classification of a lease, 
they can manipulate accounting standard and the regulatory regime. The result indicates that 
auditors are more presumably to restrict aggressive reporting under principles-based accounting 
standards than under rules-based standards, under both stronger and weaker regulatory regimes.  
Agoglia et al (2011) examine the influence of standard precision and audit committee strength on 
aggressive financial reporting. This research used case for the test of hypotheses. 96 experienced 
financial statement preparers participate in experiment and used a 2 ൈ 2 factorial design. They find 
that the more principle-based standard than more rules-based lead to participations have less likely 
to report aggressively. Also, the result indicates that when the standard is less precise, audit 
committee strength is not affect but in the presence of a strong audit committee than a weak audit 
committee and using a more precise standard is less likely for aggressive financial reporting. 
Jamal and Tan (2010) investigate of joint effects of principles-based versus rules-based standard and 
auditor type in restricting financial managers’ aggressive reporting. 90 financial managers are 
participating in experiment and employed a 2 ൈ 3 between-subjects design. They results indicate 
that with a rules-based standard, auditor-type does not influence managers’ tendency to take the 
proposed lease transaction off balance sheet. The result reveals that the auditor-type is important in a 
principles-based standard and thus, in compare to the condition which the auditor is rules-oriented or 
client oriented, the tendency to take the selected of operation lease is lowest when the auditor is 
principles-oriented. 
Overall, examine of prior research show that the constraining aggressive reporting by 
management in both a rules-based and principles-based reporting environment is converted a 
challenges for Auditors (Cohen et al, 2013). Rules-based accounting standards that include bright-
lines can authorize to preparers to forms transactions in order to meet the “bright lines” and may 
thus encourage a “check-the-box” approach (Schipper, 2003). However, principles-based accounting 
standards are in substance less violent and, thus, allow management more discretion and judgment 
(Cohen et al, 2013). Thus, it expect that in presence principle- based accounting standard, prepares 
can justify their reporting choices hardly because of both auditors and regulators are monitor on the 
financial reporting. Agoglia et al (2011) and Jamal and Tan (2010) studies suggest that internal and 
external monitoring factors can restrict aggressive management reporting behavior under principles-
based and rules-based accounting environments. 
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  Hypothesis Development 
Accounting financial reporting is useful when it prepares a base on the accounting standard. 
The rule-based and principle-based approach is used for the setting of accounting standard. In the 
accounting literature it is believed that International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is used 
the principles-based for the setting of accounting standard, whereas U.S. Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) is considered as the rules-based. Rules-based standards typically 
include very detailed guidance with bright-line tests. A perceived benefit of more detailed 
implementation guidance is greater comparability of financial statements across companies (Agoglia 
et al., 2011).  However, excessively detailed reporting guidance can lead to the company structure 
the transaction and  have motivate to  the interpretation of standard to achieve preferred accounting 
treatments (Bockus et al. , 2003 and Nelson , 2003). 
 The prior study such as Benston et al. (2006) states that because of demand for Rules-based 
standards by financial statement preparers and auditors, using this approach are increased gradually. 
Financial statement preparers and auditors believe that such detailed rules protect them from 
potential criticism for aggressive financial reporting (Benston et al., 2006). The research study of 
Maines (2007) reveal that in presence a less precise standard, it is more difficult to justify the 
aggressive financial reporting because of in the threshold of less precise standard is not explicitly 
stated. Thus, we expect that using the less precise standard cause to auditors to exercise substantially 
more professional judgment during the financial reporting process and result in a decrease of 
aggressive financial reporting. Considering the above explain the research such as Bedard et al 
(2004) and Agoglia et al (2011), we proposed the following hypotheses: 
H1: Auditors using a less precise financial reporting standard will be less likely to make an 
aggressive financial reporting decision than Auditors using a more precise standard. 
The audit committee represents a key corporate governance mechanism, in that it is viewed 
as one of the most important monitors of the financial reporting process (Blue Ribbon Committee, 
1999). The role of audit committee in company can include the responsible for select the company’s 
independent auditor, supervising the work of the auditor, resolving the issue between management 
and the auditor, and monitoring internal controls. Consequently, the financial reporting quality is 
increase if the company has the strong audit committee.  The strong audit committee members have 
independence and expertise in the accounting and audit work. The prior research such as Bedard et 
al (2004) and Agoglia et al (2011) this notion is appears that audit committee independence, 
experience and activity can enhance the monitoring and supervise of management which result to 
less aggressive financial reporting. Thus, we expect that interaction between audit committee and 
accounting standard setting approach have the effect on the aggressive financial reporting. 
Considering the above explain and the research such as Bedard et al (2004) and Agoglia et al 
(2011), we proposed the following hypotheses:  
H2: The interaction audit committee and more precise standard lead to the auditor judgment 
about aggressive financial reporting decision are different from the auditor judgment with the 
interaction the audit committee and less precise standard. 
  Participation and Research Design  
The statistical sample of research participation includes 120 auditors (22 audit manager, 36 
senior audit supervisor, 35 audit supervisor and 28 junior auditor), which were selected by classified 
random sampling method. The average of auditors experience is 8.75 year.   
The data was collected by a questionnaire-based survey among auditors who were working at 
audit firms in Iran. A total of 120 auditors were distributed a requesting their participation in the 
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questionnaire survey (60 auditor received the rule-based scenario and 60 auditor received the 
principle-based scenario). 
Our research scenario is consistent with Agoglia et al. (2011). A research instrument includes 
four sections. The first section, the auditors read the guidelines for classifying a lease as either a 
capital or operation lease. Auditors used only on criterion i.e. the estimated economic life for the 
lease classification decision. In the more precise standard, the lease is capital if the lease term is 
“equal to 75% or more” of the estimated economic life of the leased property and in the less precise 
standard, the lease will be capitalized if the lease term is “for the major part” of the estimated 
economic life of the leased property (Agoglia et al., 2011). In secondary section were told that to 
assume the role of auditor for an artificial company that intend to a lease a new plant with an 
estimated economic life of ten years. Participants were asked that a lease be classified as an 
operating lease if it does not meet the capital lease criterion. The lease term determined for all 
auditors as the fixed non-cancellable term of the lease plus all periods covered by bargain renewal 
options. All participants were stated that a bargain renewal option happen when the lessee has the 
option to renew the lease for an amount sufficiently lower than the fair rental of the property such 
that exercise of the option appears, at the inception of the lease, to be reasonably assured (Backof et 
al., 2014). Therefore, the lease term related on participants’ reorganization of whether any renewal 
option included in the lease was a bargain. Once this determination was made, auditors had to 
exercise their judgment to determine whether the lease term met the criterion considered in the 
standard for capitalization. 
All participants wanted to assume that they were the auditors of ABC Company. ABC just 
entered into a lease for new equipment with an estimated economic life of ten years to be used to 
produce a new product. The lease has a non-cancelable lease period of seven years. Considering the 
agreement, the firm has options to renew the lease for an additional year with the monthly rental 
payment at the end of the initial non-cancelable lease period. It sets a rate that permits for some 
authorization in judging whether the renewal option represents a bargain (Agoglia et al., 2011). 
Further, the case explained that management was ambiguous about the decision to activate the 
option to renew the lease because the uncertainty over the achievement of the new product. Thus, 
ABC believed that the transaction should be classified as an operating lease. Participants were then 
provided with a summary of the impact of the alternative lease accounting treatments on the 
company’s financial statements and key ratios such as EPS and return on assets and a debt-to-equity 
ratio at the end of the first year of the lease. Participants were also told that ABC had plans to 
expand its plant to meet the growing demand for one of its other products. However, the company 
can take a loan for this expansion if ABC’s total liabilities/total equity ratio is less than a set 
threshold. Thus, the case provide very strong motivates to classify the lease as an operating lease. 
After considering the case information, participants recorded their lease classification decisions on a 
ten-point and finally, participants answered several post-experimental and demographic questions 
(three and four sections). 
Results 
We conducted an experiment using an 22 ANOVA which used standard precision and 
audit committee as an independent variable and the lease classification decision of auditor as the 
dependent variable. 
Table 1, Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the proration of auditors who selected to 
record the either operation or capital lease. Panels B show the categorical ANOVA results. Our H1 
hypothesis express that with more precise standard than less precise standard, auditors will be more 
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likely to make an aggressive financial reporting.  As Table 1 shows that for more precise standards, 
the mean of participations response are 4.90 and the mean of participations response are 7.04 for 
less precise standard. Considering F-test (F=22.34, P <0.00), we find a statistically significant 
between precise standard and financial reporting. So, this hypothesis is consistent with expectations. 
In the other words, auditors are more likely to report aggressively when presented with a more 
precise standard than with a less precise standard.  
Regarding our H2 hypothesis, Table 1, Panel B shows that audit committee is not significant 
(F=1.80, P < 0.18, significant at or below the 0.05 level). Also, Table 1, Panel B reveals that the 
interaction of between accounting standard precision and audit committee is not significant (F=0.32, 
P <0.57, significant at or below the 0.05 level). So, this hypothesis is not consistent with 
expectations. In the other words, these results indicate that audit committee has not a greater effect 
on aggressive reporting in a rules-based regime than in a more principles-based regime. We estimate 
the Levene’s test for equality of variances the between weak and strong audit committee. This result 
indicate a no significant difference between two groups (SD=2.77 and 2.64   , F=0.431, P<0.51). 
This result provides the further evidence for rejects our H2 hypothesis. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Mean (Standard Deviation) 
 Audit Committee  
Standard Precision Weak Strong Overall 
Less Precise 6.86 7.21 7.04 
 (2.41) (2.43) (2.41) 
 N=30 N=30 N=60 
More Precise 4.46 5.33 4.90 
 (2.60) (2.55) (2.59) 
 N=30 N=30 N=60 
Overall 5.66 6.30  
 (2.77) (2.64)  
 N=60 N=60  
Panel B: ANOVA Results    
 F Test  P-Value 
Corrected Model 8.19  0.00 
Accounting Standard Precision 22.34  0.00 
Audit Committee 1.80  0.18 
Accounting Standard Precision* Audit 
Committee 
0.32  0.57 
 To further examine the effect of standard precision, we divide the response of auditor to the 
two parts. Table2 present the analysis of lease classification. In the more precise standard position, 
fifty-seven percent of and forty-three percent of auditors classified lease as operation and capital 
lease, respectively. Also,  thirty-three percent of and sixty-seven of participations selected lease as 
operation and capital lease (respectively) in the less precise standard condition. Considering the 
above result, we can express that fifty-seven percent of auditors in the more precise condition 
classified it as an operation lease versus sixty-seven percent in the less precise condition. Thus, the 
result indicate that auditors in the more precise standard position are significantly more likely to take 
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the aggressive position of classification the less as an operation lease than those using a less precise 
standard. This result is the further support for our H1hypothesis. 
Table 2: Contingency Analysis of lease Classification Decision By Standard Precision 
Condition 
 lease Classification Decision  
Accounting Standard Precision Operation Lease Capital Lease Row Total 
Less Precise 20 40 60 
Row% 33.33% 66.66% 100.00% 
    
More Precise 34 26 60 
Row% 56.66% 43.44% 100.00% 
    
Column Total 54 66  
 ݔଶ ൌ 7.36 ሺܲ ൏ 0.007ሻ 
Conclusions 
Financial statement appears the useful information for users and it prepared the base on the 
accounting standard. The financial reporting prepares have a tendency which used the accounting 
standard in direction the management and company interest and thus, they prepare financial 
statement aggressively. The financial reporting prepares employ accounting standards for receive 
the aim. Rules-based accounting standard allow to preparers to structure transactions in order to 
meet the “bright lines”, while principles-based accounting standard reflect the economic substance 
of a transaction and thus, preparers have less discretion to the manipulation of transaction. Thus, the 
purpose of paper is to investigate the effect of accounting standard setting approaches and audit 
committee on the aggressive financial reporting. 
We conduct an experiment to investigate who auditors make judgment about aggressive 
reporting under accounting standards approaches. In this paper, we assume accounting reporting is 
aggressive if it is biased toward which providing the management interests. 
We find evidence that auditors are more likely to report aggressively when meet with a more precise 
standard than with a less precise standard. Thus, when auditors faced in condition that has the need 
of judgment, it is less likely allow issuing aggressive financial reporting under the less precise 
standard. This result is consistent with the notion that using the less precise standard can increase the 
financial reporting quality. This result is consistent with the prior research such as Agoglia et al 
(2011) and Cohen et al (2013). Also, we find that audit committee as a monitoring system have not 
effect on aggressive financial reporting and the interaction of accounting standard and audit 
committee have not effect on aggressive financial reporting. This result is inconsistent with prior 
research such as Agoglia et al (2011). 
This pioneering study contributes to a better understanding of the unique features of Iranian 
auditors’ judgments under rules-based versus principles-based accounting standard. A primary 
message of our paper is that a better reporting environment is created only if the accounting 
standards are principles-based.             
According to the presented result, we recommend accounting standard setters and regulators switch 
from rules-based to principles-based accounting standards because of this result indicates that 
moving toward more principles-based standards can prevent the opportunistic reporting by financial 
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statement preparers. Considering the lease accounting may not be representative of all accounting 
standards, the limitation of study is that the accounting standard restricted to lease accounting.  
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